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Introduction to Anthony C. Infanti's
TAX AND TIME: ON THE USE AND MISUSE OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (NYU Press 2022)

Introduction

Time. Its texture, nature, and qualities have long perplexed and preoccupied scientists and
philosophers alike. Indeed, as Paul Horwich put it in the preface to his book Asymmetries in
Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science: “Time is generally thought to be one of the more
mysterious ingredients in the universe. Perhaps some of the reason for this is that understanding
is often a matter of finding analogies. But time is unique; there’s nothing else remotely like it.”1
In the scientific realm, Albert Einstein famously upended preexisting notions of time and
space when he published his theory of special relativity in the early twentieth century. Horwich’s
warnings notwithstanding, Einstein later wrote a book explaining his complex theories for a
nonexpert audience.2 While hardly beach reading,3 Relativity: The Special and General Theory
endeavored to unravel some of the mysteries of time for the general reader, including the idea of
the “relativity of simultaneity.” Einstein illustrated this seemingly paradoxical notion using a
simple example, explaining that a passenger traveling in a train would not perceive simultaneous
lightning strikes at opposite ends of the railway line as having occurred simultaneously because
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the passenger would be traveling toward one of the lightning strikes and away from the other
while the light from the strikes was traveling toward the train.4
Before and after publication of Einstein’s theory of relativity, continental philosophy—
which is notoriously less accessible reading than Relativity: The Special and General Theory—
likewise engaged with questions of time and temporality. In fact, in the introduction to Time and
Philosophy: A History of Continental Thought, John McCumber described continental
philosophy in all its “boisterous diversity” as “the philosophical resonance of time itself.”5
McCumber continued:
For time is the slipperiest of topics, and one of its aspects—the future—is
by definition unknowable, an inscrutable source of unimagined surprise. New
ways of understanding it are thus inevitable. Moreover, if a single method, or
even family of methods, for understanding the future could be settled on,
continental philosophy would have discovered a truth or truths held for all time,
and would itself become traditional. The proliferation of different ways of
conceiving not only the future, but also the past and present, is thus part and
parcel of continental philosophy’s temporalized approach.6
For most of us, however, the passage of time doesn’t seem slippery or mysterious. It just
seems normal and natural, calling for no great introspection such as that engaged in by Einstein
or continental philosophers. We take time for granted as we live our lives. We set off to, and
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later return home from, work, school, or errands each day. As we proceed through our routines,
the sun reliably rises and sets each day, and as the days accumulate, one season, year, or even
stage of life passes to the next, occupying no more than the background of our life stories. This is
not to say that we are wholly oblivious to the passage of time, because our perception and
experience of time do occasionally vary and thus become noticeable to us. For example, time can
seem to move at different speeds in different situations—whether excruciatingly slowly,
remarkably quickly, or perhaps even not at all, as so many of us were reminded when confined to
our homes during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021.7 Or, we might occasionally find
ourselves lost in reverie regarding real or imagined times past, present, or future.8 Nonetheless,
we tend to take time as a given in our daily lives and operate within and through time without
giving it much thought.
When we do give thought to time, whether in life or in law, we generally perceive it as
linear; that is, we think of time as moving from the past through the present and into the future—
such as the progression from morning to evening; from one day or week to the next; and, over
the course of our lifespans, from birth to death—with no possibility of reversing this flow. Just
consider how we talk about time: we characterize it as flowing, passing, going by, or even flying
by.9 As anthropologist Carol Greenhouse has put it:
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“We” moderns are supposed to know that time is “really” linear and infinitely so.
We are supposed to know that time is about motion, change, mortality, and
progress. We are supposed to know that linear time rationalized the periodicity of
cyclical time and lifted the veils of timelessness from the now-visible face of
human experience, and that the clock is the essential technology of modern life.
But “we” have also devised a strategy for resisting linear time: we imagine that
there exist people not preoccupied with change; we are supposed to know that
some of them are happier, more sociable, more provincial, more attuned to nature
and less skeptical of their rituals. If we are romantics, we imagine ourselves
experiencing this liberation in love, faith, or travel to exotic places. If we are postmoderns, though, we also know that we are not supposed to think this. The
difficulty of developing intellectual strategies for dismantling the privileges of
linear time cross-culturally and, even more so, in the examination of more
familiar cultural terrain, is compounded by such contemporary Western
engagements with the idea of time.10
But as we will explore in the pages of this book, there is no need to fall in love, to
embrace religion, to vacation on a tropical island, or even to embrace a postmodernist
perspective in order to liberate ourselves from the linear representation of time that ostensibly
rules our daily lives and our laws. To witness and experience the plasticity of time, we need look
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no further than the tax system. You might be asking yourself: “Tax? What is so important about
tax law that merits a book considering the relationship between time and tax law? Why should
we care about how time is used in tax law?” The answer to these questions is simple: tax law is
simultaneously omnipresent in our lives, the essential lifeblood of the society that we share
together, and a tangible expression of what and whom society values. Itself a powerful presence
in our lives, time intertwines with tax law in a myriad of ways—some easily seen, others
unnoticed, but all eminently pliable and capable of remodeling. These interactions between time
and tax law can affect how the burden of funding public goods is distributed and serve to shape
the messages that the tax system sends about what and whom society values. How we choose to
manage—and, often to creatively manipulate—these interactions between time and tax law thus
implicates fundamental questions of social justice that should concern—and be brought to the
attention of—all members of society.

The Importance of Examining Tax Time
Unlike many other areas of law, tax law touches each of our lives on a daily basis.11 To take the
United States (where I live) as an example: Americans interact with the tax system as they go
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If, as Carol Greenhouse suggests, law exists in an “all-times,” see infra text accompanying
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tax law.
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about their routines each day, whether they realize it or not. When they run errands (in virtual or
real life), they often pay sales taxes on the goods or services they purchase.12 When they work,
they create income and/or payroll tax liabilities—a fact that is driven home each pay period by
withholding that their employers subtract from their wages and pay over to the government (or,
for the self-employed, through quarterly payments of estimated taxes to the government).13
When they fill up the gas tank in their car, they pay excise taxes.14 When they find a place to
live, they pay property taxes (directly or indirectly) on the roof over their heads.15 Even births
and deaths can trigger tax consequences; for instance, they can claim a newborn child as a
dependent for income tax purposes and can trigger estate or inheritance tax obligations when
they pass away.16
Without all of the taxes that are paid every day, we wouldn’t have police to protect us,
public transportation or highways to drive on, schools to send our children to, courts to settle our
disputes, or any of the other physical and social structures that government provides to facilitate
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our lives together and to ensure that society runs as smoothly as possible. Moreover, taxes are
not only ubiquitous and necessary to fund the provision of public goods but also serve an
important expressive function.17 Each member of society does not contribute equally to funding
public goods, because so-called head taxes are seen as neither a popular nor a fair way of
distributing the tax burden. Instead, in crafting a tax system that allows for differing
contributions to the common good based on ability to pay, a society expresses its collective
notion of what a fair distribution of the tax burden looks like. Whether those who have reaped
greater benefit from the socioeconomic structures that government has created are called upon to
contribute more—or less—than those who have been left out or left behind speaks volumes
about a society. Moreover, the choices made regarding precisely what, whom, and how to tax say
things about what and whom a society values. Placing a tax imprimatur on someone or
something is no empty statement; after all, tax encouragement or approval comes in the form of
tangible financial benefits (e.g., tax exemptions, deductions, or credits). Conversely, tax
discouragement or disapproval results in a heavier exaction that is experienced through the sting
of a tax penalty.
Unsurprisingly, then, how a country uses time in its tax laws sends important messages
about its political, social, and cultural context. We will discover through our exploration of “tax
time” that, far from linear or even romantic, time in tax law is really what we make of it—and
what has been made of it, particularly in the United States, resembles more the fantastical
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creations of literary fiction than it does run-of-the-mill legal fictions.18 As with literature,
studying manipulations of time in and through US tax law helps to reveal the character of
Americans as a people, by shining a light both on their good intentions in imagining a more just
world and on the more sinister side of the tax imagination that uses time to entrench and
exacerbate existing inequalities in US society.
But in the limited space of these pages, we will not be able to examine the relationship
between time and all of the different taxes that exist in the United States. Rather, the primary
focus in here will be on examining select aspects of the relationship between time and the
income tax, as it “raises particularly interesting issues because income is a concept defined by
reference to time.”19 Furthermore, the income tax is perhaps the most salient of taxes in the
United States as well as the source of more than half of all US federal tax revenue—not to
mention a significant source of revenue in other countries too.20
The remainder of this introduction begins our study of tax time by first discussing some
of the obvious ways in which time surfaces in US federal income tax law—from the need to
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determine the appropriate period for reporting tax to establishing methods of accounting for
allocating income and expenses among reporting periods to more esoteric questions about the
“time value of money.” Having acknowledged the practical timing questions that face taxpayers,
their advisers, and the Internal Revenue Service, this introduction then makes clear that the focus
of this book is not on revisiting this well-trodden ground. Instead, this book opens tax law to a
burgeoning area of research that explores the deeper and more complicated connections between
law and time. A brief survey of US contributions to this line of research is provided to give the
reader a sense of the types of interesting and thought-provoking questions already being
examined outside the tax area—from how law constructs time to questioning the linear
representation of time to revealing the multiplicity of ways in which time can be seen as
operating through and within law.
The final section of this introduction then lays out the basic idea underpinning this book
and sketches out how that idea will be explored in the coming chapters. Put simply, the basic
thesis of this book is that time can be seen as surfacing in tax law in important ways that are
untethered from conventional notions of time and that are more akin to creative acts of legal
imagination. Upending taken-for-granted linear notions of time, we will explore how, through
tax law, it is possible to travel back in time by rewriting the past and then to act upon that
rewritten past in the tax present and future as if it had actually occurred. We will consider how
time is converted into a currency in tax law—a currency that taxpayers can use to purchase
valuable benefits and one that is regularly dispensed by government as a reward. And showing
that we do not (and should not) always take time for granted, we will examine how taxpayers
sometimes react to exercises of the tax imagination, fearing the ways in which the imaginative
power of tax time might be used against them. As a US tax academic, my main focus is on

9

exploring the intersection of tax and time in US law; however, given my interest in comparative
tax law,21 throughout these chapters we will also consider examples from other countries when
those examples might enrich the discussion by reinforcing a point or by providing an interesting
contrast to the US approach to dealing with tax time.
As a self-identified critical tax scholar—that is to say, as someone who is concerned with
the operation of our tax laws on marginalized groups and in working to advance tax and social
justice—I also consider throughout this book the broader, normative questions raised by these
examples of the tax imagination at work. After all, as Emily Grabham and Siân Beynon-Jones
have observed, “analyzing the ‘making’ of legal temporalities, if anything, only intensifies our
accountability and responsibility to act in and on the world in ways that work toward social
justice.”22 With this admonition in mind, once freed from the bonds of convention and
empowered to imagine a world that is simultaneously within and beyond time, I ask to what end
this imaginative power has been brought to bear. Has the power to reimagine time been used to
serve ends of justice or injustice? Having created a socially constructed notion of time that
directly affects the doling out of tax benefits and the imposition of tax burdens, what do the
choices made in deploying the tax imagination say about society—about what and whom society
values and, conversely, about what and whom society ignores or devalues? With a heightened
awareness of the unbounded nature of tax time, I argue that a systematic examination needs to be
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undertaken to assess and reimagine how society engages with and deploys time in and through
tax law.
With these questions in mind and a basic sense of where the analysis is headed, we are
now ready to embark on our journey into the imaginative realm of tax time.

Timing Issues in Tax Law
Time pervades tax law just as it pervades our lives. In the basic federal income tax course that I
teach every fall, an entire chapter of the textbook is devoted to questions of timing.23 And when I
was working on my Master of Laws (LLM) degree in taxation many years ago, an entire course
was devoted to timing issues in the income tax.24 When taught to students in these courses—and
even when discussed in policy circles or in the academic tax literature—the questions of timing
that merit consideration are practical in focus and take the legally and culturally prevalent linear
representation of time as a given. In other words, time is simply seen as part of the natural
background against which tax law operates.25 And mimicking nature, the choices that have been
made in adapting US tax law to linear time often create their own rhythms and patterns akin to
the cyclical time that we experience in the repetitive passage from day to night or from one
season to the next as we proceed through our lives.

23
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Reporting Period
At their most basic level, these timing questions involve the when of income taxation. Once it
has been decided who will be subject to tax, what income will be taxed, and how that income
will be taxed, it must be determined when income taxation will occur. Should taxpayers report
their income on a transactional basis or at periodic intervals? And if income is to be reported
periodically, what interval should be chosen? Should income be reported every day, every year,
once a decade, once in a lifetime—or at some other interval? With April 15 etched in the
American consciousness as “tax day”—an annual ritual that has come to mark the cyclical
passage of time from one tax “season” to the next—it likely comes as no surprise that the United
States has settled on an annual reporting period.26
Of course, tax law being what it is, there are exceptions to this annual accounting
framework that aim to mitigate some of the hardships of having a system too rigidly tied to linear
time.27 These exceptions are designed to make the income tax fairer from the taxpayer’s
perspective, the government’s perspective, or sometimes both. An example of each type of
exception follows.
To aid taxpayers, Congress enacted the deduction for net operating losses early in the
history of the income tax.28 Generally, net operating losses can now be carried forward
indefinitely (before 2018, net operating losses were generally carried back two taxable years and

26

I.R.C. § 441.
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forward twenty taxable years).29 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, this
deduction aims to benefit taxpayers by “ameliorat[ing] the unduly drastic consequences of taxing
income strictly on an annual basis. [The deduction was] designed to permit a taxpayer to set off
its lean years against its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable income
computed over a period longer than one year.”30 In this way, the deduction operates in linear
time but extends the periodicity of the income tax. Before 2018, the net operating loss deduction
extended the income tax’s periodicity over a finite segment of linear time that included both the
past and future. Now, the deduction extends that periodicity only into the future but over a
potentially lengthier segment of linear time (i.e., the life of an individual or the virtual life of an
entity).31
A second exception to the annual accounting framework is the so-called Arrowsmith
doctrine, which stems from a case “holding that taxpayers who reported capital gain on the
complete liquidation of a closely held corporation could not deduct from ordinary income their
subsequent payment of corporate obligations that had been neglected at the time of

29

Compare I.R.C. § 172, with id. (prior to amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No.

115-97, § 13302, 131 Stat. 2054, 2121–23 (2017)).
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liquidation.”32 This exception protects the government by preventing taxpayers from reporting
gain on a transaction as capital gain taxed at preferential rates in one year and then, in a later
taxable year, reporting a related payment as an ordinary deduction that is freed from the
limitations imposed on capital losses and, therefore, can be used to offset income taxed at higher
rates.
Yet a third example of an exception to the annual accounting framework is the “tax
benefit rule,” which can protect either or both the taxpayer and the government. The tax benefit
rule protects the government by taxing recoveries of amounts previously deducted (e.g., refunded
state or local income taxes) when the earlier deduction produced a tax benefit.33 By increasing
income in the year of the recovery, the tax benefit rule makes the government roughly whole for
the revenue lost due to the (now, seemingly inappropriate) deduction in the earlier year.
Conversely, the rule protects the taxpayer by shielding the recovery from taxation if the earlier
deduction produced no tax benefit. Again quoting the Supreme Court: “The basic purpose of the
tax benefit rule is to achieve rough transactional parity in tax … and to protect the Government
and the taxpayer from the adverse effects of reporting a transaction on the basis of assumptions
that an event in a subsequent year proves to have been erroneous.”34
Despite requiring the taxpayer or the government to take a peek at an earlier return, both
the Arrowsmith doctrine and the tax benefit rule continue to operate strictly within the annual
accounting framework and thus within linear time. In other words, neither the Arrowsmith
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BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 28, ¶ 47.9.6; see Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
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See I.R.C. § 111.

34

Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983).
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doctrine nor the tax benefit rule permits the taxpayer to go back in time and reopen or amend an
earlier return. Instead, both simply require a look back at past events to determine the appropriate
reporting of an amount on the current year’s tax return.35
Accounting Methods
Once the appropriate period for reporting income and paying tax to the government have been
established, questions arise about how to determine during which year an item of income or
deduction should be reported. The basic methods of accounting are (1) the cash receipts and
disbursements method and (2) the accrual method.36 The cash method is commonly used by
individual taxpayers, and it requires income to be reported in the year when received and allows
deductions to be taken when payments are made.37 The accrual method is used more commonly
by businesses; in fact, some business are prohibited from using the cash method and are thus
effectively required to use the accrual method.38 Under the accrual method, income is reported in
“the taxable year when all the events have occurred that fix the right to receive the income and
the amount of the income can be determined with reasonable accuracy,” and deductions are
generally allowed “in the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish the
fact of the liability [and] the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable

35

See Arrowsmith, 344 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.

United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 659, 665 (1967).
36

I.R.C. § 446(c).
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Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2011).
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accuracy.”39 Accordingly, reporting of income and deductions under the accrual method need not
track when income is received or expenses are paid, as happens under the cash method.
To maintain the integrity of these two methods of accounting, concepts from one method
are sometimes incorporated into the other. Thus, to prevent those on the cash method from
simply turning their back on income in order to receive it in a later year (when, for instance, the
taxpayer might expect to be in a lower tax bracket or to have more deductions), the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has created a rule under which “[i]ncome although not actually reduced
to a taxpayer’s possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon
it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention
to withdraw had been given.”40 And to prevent accrual method taxpayers from manipulating the
“all events” test for accruing deductions, Congress adopted an “economic performance”
requirement in 1984 that in a variety of situations (e.g., payment of tort claims, jackpots and
prizes, and taxes) effectively puts accrual method taxpayers on the cash method by deferring
deductions until expenses are actually paid.41
Of course, these general methods and their complexities do not address all the questions
taxpayers might have regarding when to report income or deductions. Indeed, the regulations
specify that the “term ‘method of accounting’ includes not only the overall method of accounting

39
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Id. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
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98-861, at 871 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 28, ¶ 105.6.4.
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of the taxpayer but also the accounting treatment of any item.”42 The regulations go on to
provide that, apart from the cash and accrual methods of accounting, the “methods of accounting
for special items include the accounting treatment prescribed for research and experimental
expenditures, soil and water conservation expenditures, depreciation, net operating losses, etc.”43
In addition, the IRS is empowered to require larger businesses to use inventories where
necessary “clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer,” raising timing issues regarding
whether the items of inventory sold each year are determined on a first-in, first-out basis or a
last-in, first-out basis (there are known in the trade as “FIFO” and “LIFO”)).44 Furthermore, the
IRS has been granted a more general and wide-ranging power to dictate a taxpayer’s method of
accounting if the method that the taxpayer has adopted “does not clearly reflect income.”45
Rules regarding the timing of income inclusion and of reporting deductions can also crop
up implicitly, as they do in the requirement that gains and losses from property transactions must
be reported upon the occurrence of a “realization” event (i.e., a sale or other disposition of
property).46 This rule largely places timing in the hands of the taxpayer and serves as a key
source of tax planning and, as explored in chapter 4, tax avoidance.47 In fact, “loss harvesting” is

42

Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(1).
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Id.
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LOKKEN, supra note 28, ¶ 107.5.1.
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such a common tax planning strategy that it is often included among the end-of-year tax tips
offered to newspaper readers around the country each December.48 But the common denominator
of all of these accounting rules is the attempt to determine the appropriate period within linear
time for reporting an item on the tax return.
Time Value of Money
As Lawrence Lokken observed in the first few lines of his treatise-length law review article on
the subject, “heightened sensitivity to the importance of interest and the time value of money”
coupled with rising tax shelter activity in the 1970s and 1980s led to a complex web of tax rules
dealing with disguised payments of interest.49 Among them are the “original issue discount”
rules that recharacterize discount on the issuance of debt as interest and require that interest to be
accrued ratably over the debt instrument’s term.50 Other rules similarly recharacterize amounts as
interest when debt is issued in the context of a sale or exchange of property.51 Yet another set of

48
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rules imputes interest (both for income and, where relevant, gift tax purposes) on: (1) belowmarket loans between employers and employees or corporations and shareholders, (2) gift loans
(i.e., “where the forgoing of interest is in the nature of a gift”), and (3) tax-avoidance loans.52 Of
course, there are also rules that aim to prevent taxpayers from manipulating the use of interest
deductions to artificially depress their income.53
In addition to addressing the appropriate taxation of disguised interest, “time value of
money” operates as a broader rubric that likewise encompasses taxpayers’ appreciation that they
can benefit from accelerating deductions (i.e., tax savings) and deferring income (i.e., tax
burdens). As Mary Louise Fellows has put it: “‘Time value of money’ is a shorthand reference to
the simple principle that a person prefers a dollar today over one tomorrow, because, by
investing today’s dollar, that person tomorrow will have not only the dollar but also an
investment return on it.”54 In an earlier (and different) time and context, these time-value-ofmoney considerations were downplayed as relatively unimportant.55 Indeed, the noted economist
Henry Simons famously referred to “the argument that income must be allocated to the right
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period, in order to eliminate the ‘interest saving’ from deferral, ‘this mosquito argument,’ at
which he had ‘several times swatted … [and] must now swat once more, [albeit] not to kill the
pest.’”56 Underpinning Simons’s view was his avowed skepticism regarding the possibility that
income might “be allocated precisely among short time-intervals”57 and his concomitant favoring
of multiyear income averaging over a strict (and manipulable) annual accounting system.58
Taxpayers and their advisers, however, have become acutely aware of (and have actively
exploited) the opportunities to minimize taxation that are available when the tax system is
viewed through a time-value-of-money lens—and Congress and the IRS have fought back
against these attempts to reap unwarranted and unintended tax benefits.59 For instance,
exploitation of time-value-of-money considerations lay at the heart of the individual tax shelters
that bedeviled Congress and the IRS in the 1970s and 1980s.60 For a far longer period—which
still continues, despite recent changes to the law—time-value-of-money considerations have
been at the core of multifaceted gamesmanship with the US international tax regime, which has
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involved the use of corporate entities to shift profits offshore and then keep them offshore to
defer US taxation.61
As was the case with the accounting methods discussed earlier, the common denominator
of all of these time-value-of-money schemes is their heavy reliance on the linear representation
of time. Whether taxpayers are attempting to convert interest into another form of (presumably
more lightly taxed) income or to accelerate deductions or defer income, the background against
which these schemes operate is the linear distinction between, and juxtaposition of, the past,
present, and future.
Amending Returns
Yet, even within a tax system ostensibly wedded to linear time, we can glimpse the legal
imagination chafing at the restrictions imposed by time’s arrow. For instance, after filing an
original income tax return, a taxpayer may amend that return “to modify, supplement, or
supplant the taxpayer’s original return [or] to claim a refund.”62 The Internal Revenue Code
(Code) neither specifically authorizes nor requires taxpayers to amend an erroneous return;
rather, as the Supreme Court has observed, “an amended return is a creature of administrative
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origin and grace.”63 Regulations encourage—but do not require—the filing of an amended return
when a taxpayer discovers a mistake in the original return.64 Because amended returns are a
creature of the administrative imagination, the IRS is not bound to accept them and has the
discretion to reject them.65
Through amended returns, the IRS seems to provide taxpayers with a vehicle for
traveling back in time to correct past mistakes and clean up the historical record. However, the
mechanism for amending the return actually constrains taxpayers’ ability to travel through time,
illustrating the influence of linear time over even this limited exercise of the tax imagination. In
the United States, individuals are generally required to file Form 1040 by April 15 each year.66
Once a Form 1040 is filed, a taxpayer wishing to amend that return does not submit a new Form
1040. Instead, the taxpayer completes a different form—Form 1040-X—that includes both the
original and the corrected information along with an indication of the net change in what was
originally reported.67 In this way, the taxpayer is not really permitted to travel back in time but is
afforded the more limited power to write in the margins of history. In fact, the IRS makes this
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very point in the context of providing a “tip” to taxpayers about how most easily to complete
Form 1040-X: “Many find the easiest way to figure the entries for Form 1040-X is to first make
the changes in the margin of the return they are amending.”68 Accordingly, an amended return is
less a rewriting of the past and more an admission of past error in the here and now.
The Supreme Court underscored the limited nature of an amended return’s power to
rewrite the past when it squarely rejected taxpayers’ suggestions that the filing of a fraudulent
original return should be cured through the filing of an honest amended return.69 The only
situation in which an amended return may supersede a mistaken original is when the amended
return is filed before the due date for the original return (e.g., before the April 15 deadline for
individual returns).70 In that situation, it seems that the past is not yet past; that is, it has not yet
been indelibly written and is capable of erasure and correction—but only until the point when the
filing deadline is reached along time’s arrow.
Despite itself being a product of imagination, the amended return—much like the other
aspects of tax time described earlier—is both influenced and confined by the rigid strictures of
linear time. But this peek at the tax imagination at work foreshadows much more powerful—and
often more hidden—displays of creativity that will be explored in coming chapters as we delve
more deeply into the relationship between time and tax law.
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The Deeper Relationship Between Law and Time
All of these various timing aspects of taxation are undeniably important because they
continuously raise issues for taxpayers and policymakers to address, both in the United States71
and in other countries.72 Nevertheless, the purpose of this book is not to add yet another set of
footprints to this well-trodden ground. Rather, picking up on the glimpse of the tax imagination
witnessed in the discussion of amended returns, this book strikes off on a different path by
contributing to a growing body of research that has moved beyond examining the practical,
surface-level relationship between law and time73 and progressed toward a focus on the deeper,
more complicated connections between them.
Contributions to this line of research from the United States have, among other things,
contested how time is taken as a given, questioned the linear representation of time that
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predominates in US law and culture, revealed the multiplicity of ways in which time can be
conceptualized and in which it can operate in and through law, and even considered the ways in
which law structures time in the United States. In the coming chapters, this book will likewise
cast doubt on the conventional acceptance of linear time that was so clearly on display in the
preceding discussion of timing issues in tax law. To lay the groundwork for these efforts to shake
the unquestioning acceptance of time as “natural” or a “given” when constructing, interpreting,
and applying tax laws, the following sections sketch how this same work has been done by US
researchers outside the realm of tax law. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that US scholars
are not the only ones who have explored the deeper relationships between law and time;74
however, for the sake of brevity and focus, the US line of research in this area will be spotlighted
here.
Time and Lawmaking
A portion of this line of research exploring the deeper relationships between law and time
outside of the tax context focuses on the relationship between time and lawmaking and
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demonstrates just how varied—and nonlinear—the temporalities of lawmaking can be. For
instance, approaching the subject from a political science perspective, Bruce Peabody has used
examples of constitutional and statutory interpretation to demonstrate how “it is intellectually
productive to think of the present as having an impact on the past—in ways that go beyond mere
(re)interpretation.”75 Put more directly, Peabody claimed to show how “the hands of the present
grasp and transform the past.”76
In an interesting example of this phenomenon, Peabody examined the debate over former
president Bill Clinton’s eligibility to serve as vice president.77 According to the Twenty-Second
Amendment to the US Constitution, “No person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice … .”78 On its face, this amendment seems to prevent Clinton only from being
elected president and not from being elected vice president.79 Yet, Peabody pointed to arguments
made by those questioning Clinton’s eligibility for the vice presidency who asserted that the
Twenty-Second Amendment must be read in conjunction with the Twelfth Amendment, which
provides that “no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to
that of Vice-President of the United States.”80 These critics argued that Clinton’s ineligibility for
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election as president (because he had already served two terms) rendered him ineligible for
election as vice president.81 Peabody contended that this argument
serves to illustrate the extent to which some legal arguments implicitly assume
that contemporary legal structures can transform the original content and
significance of past law. Whatever the Twelfth Amendment’s eligibility
restrictions meant when it was formally approved in 1804, they presumably did
not include the terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment—ratified almost 150
years later. Nevertheless, arguments that Clinton is ineligible to serve as vice
president seem based on an assumption that the ratification of the Twenty-Second
Amendment altered the basic, initial terms of the Twelfth Amendment’s
eligibility provisions; the claim is not that the Twenty-Second Amendment simply
legally amended or supplemented the existing language of the Twelfth
Amendment, but that it helped to define the very parameters and authority of the
earlier provision.82
Overall, Peabody maintained that “the American legal system’s common law foundations, as
well as its formality and commitment to serving as both a constitutive and aspirational endeavor,
make it especially conducive to meaningful reversals of the traditional path of ‘time’s arrow.’”83
Considering lawmaking through the courts, anthropologist Carol Greenhouse has
attempted to shake linear time from its privileged position through an exploration of time’s
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varying implications in the succession of United States Supreme Court justices.84 For
Greenhouse, “[j]udicial succession is particularly relevant … in that it is precisely in succession
that multiple temporalities—of the law, personal lifetimes, and public lives—and their
indeterminacies must be worked out.”85 As Greenhouse observed, Supreme Court vacancies are
usually related to the justices’ personal lifetimes—that is, they are caused by a justice’s death or
decline—and these lifetimes have distinct beginning and ending points as well as a linear
direction.86 But the finite, linear time frame of individual justices’ lifetimes contrasts with the
temporality of law, which the justices are supposed to embody, because law exists in “a form of
timelessness, or, more accurately, all-times, a form of time which stipulates time as social, but
not with geometric metaphors.”87 Further complicating matters is the question of how and when
an individual becomes a Supreme Court justice:
The special temporal symbolism of the law requires a special “kind” of person,
one who will find the law, not make it; know the law, but not preach it; be a
representative of the national community, but have no causes of his or her own.
These three temporal charters are by no means easily reconciled. Their
reconciliation is possible only with the deft management of essential temporal
symbols, that is, by downplaying or suppressing altogether aspects of a judicial
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“career” that entail becoming. It is in becoming a judge that any tensions between
individuality and a judicial persona would be most evident.88
In a later book, A Moment’s Notice: Time Politics Across Cultures,89 Greenhouse
continued her examination of becoming a Supreme Court justice as part of a larger project
regarding the role of time (and particularly linear time) in ethnographic studies. Greenhouse
described this larger project as challenging how, in anthropology, “linear time stands relatively
unquestioned as self-evident, a social time but also ‘the time.’ Part of [her] experiment [was] to
consider linear time as equally a social time, to demonstrate how reexoticizing linear time affects
one’s approach to other time forms elsewhere.”90 Greenhouse revisited Supreme Court
succession as part of this project because it implicated “at least three essentially different forms
of time”91: (1) the general perception of time as infinite, linear, and irreversible (what
Greenhouse called “the time of biographies and national histories, among other things”); (2) the
time of the law, which is without a fixed endpoint and is reversible (both in the sense that past
precedent can control present decisions and in the sense that past precedent can be reversed); and
(3) the finite life of the individual judge.92 To explore the interaction of these different forms of
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time, Greenhouse examined the role of autobiography in the confirmation hearings of Robert
Bork and Clarence Thomas.93
In examining Bork’s confirmation hearings, Greenhouse focused on Bork’s “retraction
problem” with some of his earlier writings and the resulting clash between, on the one hand, the
senators who were placing Bork, his past experiences, and his future judicial decision-making on
the Supreme Court in an implicitly linear time framework and, on the other hand, Bork, who
initially resisted that framing. “While committee members seemed to expect to ‘meet’ Bork
somewhere on a continuous time line between his past and his future, he came to them from a
discontinuous past as an individual who had successfully fulfilled multiple professional roles and
looked forward to the possibility of others.”94 Ultimately, Bork lost “control over his
autobiographical narrative in the face of committee pressure to reconstitute his life story as a
sequence of personal choices, rather than a series of professional commitments.”95 Greenhouse
continued: “In successfully translating his self-presentation into conventional male
autobiographical form, the committee reinterpreted his life story as one of successive
engagements; his supporters and critics differed only as to their characterization of these
engagements and his effectiveness in representing the interests they involved. The adversarial
aspects of the hearings became, in this respect, a collaborative project to make Bork’s life
representative. In this way, the senators improvised a vocabulary that spoke directly through
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Bork to the contests between a conservative executive branch and a relatively more liberal
legislative branch.”96
In examining Clarence Thomas’s first set of confirmation hearings, Greenhouse
considered how “his biography was repeatedly invoked to assert that his identity as an African
American was proof of his ability to represent, through memory, African Americans’ struggles
for civil rights and social justice in his future tenure on the Supreme Court.”97 The senators who
supported his nomination, as well as Thomas himself, used the linear framework of his
biography “as a way of defining African American identity as an identity of discrimination,
celebrating Thomas’s personal success, and expanding the conceptual frame around the
substantive issues on which he might be challenged, to narrow and contain them.”98
Reflecting on both sets of confirmation hearings, Greenhouse asserted:
Because the temporal element was so explicit in them, the Bork and Thomas
hearings are useful illustrations of the extent to which notions of judicial
succession in the United States are highly charged with issues of individuality,
nationhood, sacredness, and the nature of textuality, among other things. But there
is more. The unprecedented relevance of nominees’ autobiographies must … be
understood in relation to the public and highly politicized construction of the
United States as a diverse and increasingly culturally fragmented society. The
individual autobiographies were constructed in the hearings in such a way as to
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highlight particular issues and images associated, in Bork’s case, with the
intensely ideologized battles over reproductive choice in the middle to late 1980s
leading up to the 1988 presidential election and, in Thomas’s case, with the Bush
administration’s effort to confound liberal opposition by nominating an African
American—and a conservative.99
Greenhouse closed both the case study in A Moment’s Notice and her earlier essay with the
following observation: “‘The law’ is cultural not only, or not first, in its patterned processes and
outcomes, but in its constitution in multiple temporalities and their indeterminacies. Specifically,
law, as an idea, carries cultural force because it engages these temporalities and their critical
incongruities so directly.”100 In the case study, she then elaborated on this observation by
focusing on the differing temporalities of the nation and the individual in the larger context of the
idea of justice that lies beyond time: “These incongruities are reinforced in the United States,
where democratic rhetorics stress the capacity of public institutions to represent collective
personal interests. The contemporary view of the United States as culturally divided adds to the
premium and power of the symbols that fuse individual life stories to the linear time of the
state.”101
Others concerned with the intersection between time and lawmaking have ruminated on
the tensions between the increasingly harried (and hurried) pace of modern life and the
traditionally staid and slow-moving pace of legal development through common law decision-
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making by judges.102 Approaching the topic from the perspective of an active judge, Andrew
Wistrich has explored the influence of both the past and future on the law—for example, how
lawyers study past precedent to shape future conduct or to predict how a court might rule in a
given situation.103 But Wistrich mostly sketched what he saw as a general shift of lawmaking in
the United States toward a predominantly future-oriented approach and mindset:
The overall trend is clear: in lawmaking of every sort, and in the relative
proportions in which the methods of lawmaking are employed, the role of the past
is waning, and the role of the future is waxing. The common law has been
dethroned, and statutes, treaties, and regulations have been enthroned in its place.
As a consequence, law today is surprisingly future-oriented, and it is rapidly
becoming more so. Law’s memory of past law still matters, of course, but the
influence of the past in the lawmaking process is declining.104
Wistrich detected this shift not only in the means used for lawmaking (i.e., the rising use of
statutes, treaties, and regulations as opposed to common law decision-making) but also in the
method of common law decision-making itself (e.g., the erosion of the force of precedent, the
ability of the Supreme Court to set its own agenda by choosing the cases that it will review, and
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the rise of “institutional reform litigation” that turns judges into administrators).105 Though
aiming to be even-handed in his treatment of the relationship between time and lawmaking, it is
hard not to detect in Wistrich’s prose an undercurrent of wistful longing for a time when things
moved a bit more slowly and his own profession—judging—was on top of the lawmaking
heap.106
Instrumental Time
Other contributions to this line of research outside of the tax context have considered how time
can be used as a tool to achieve a goal or even to inflict punishment. David Engel provides an
example of the former approach, highlighting how time can be manipulated to achieve desired
ends. Engel challenged the dominant linear framework of time and demonstrated how time can
be used as a tool in advocating for (or resisting against) social change through his documentation
of how different groups within a single county “constructed their versions of the community’s
past, present, and future”—and the role of law and legal institutions in it—using different
temporal perspectives.107 The more conservative, traditional groups in the county embraced an
iterative notion of time in which repeated cycles (in this case, of seasonal farming) reinforced
community values, whereas more progressive groups advocating for change (in this case, those
who supported the location of an industrial plant in the county) embraced a linear notion of time
against which change could be measured.108 These different temporal lenses “played
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complementary roles in shaping the local culture and in marking out the temporal field in which
… events could be viewed and interpreted.”109 Concretely demonstrating the socially constructed
nature of time, Engel described how the conflict between these groups over whether an industrial
plant should be located in the county brought to the fore “conflicting ideas about time and
change,” with the more conservative group valuing stability and arguing “that change implied the
erosion and loss of their traditional culture and values,” whereas the more progressive group
wished to avoid stagnation and argued that failing to bring the plant to the community “implied a
failure of vision and will and hence a cultural deterioration.”110
Illustrating a different way in which time can be used instrumentally, Jonathan GoldbergHiller and David Johnson have considered criminal punishment through a temporal lens.111 In
their essay “Time and Punishment,” Goldberg-Hiller and Johnson “describe[d] some of the ways
that attention to time deepens our appreciation of the pain associated with punishment and …
offer[ed] new perspectives from which to understand and critique time’s role in the
administration of justice.”112 For example, they tapped into religion when considering the role
that belief in an afterlife might play in different countries’ continued support for, or
abandonment of, capital punishment.113 They noted the irony in leveling the harshest
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punishments for premeditated murders when, “in one of the many contradictions of capital
punishment, states kill in a manner that is far more premeditated than even the most precisely
planned murder”—and do so in ways that use time to inflict additional punishment (e.g., by
having a death sentence hang over the head of the convicted for decades in the United States or
by having the precise date and time of execution kept from the convicted in Japan until just
before the execution takes place).114 And tapping into literature describing a day in a prisoner’s
life in a Soviet labor camp and Supermax inmates’ experience of a day, Goldberg-Hiller and
Johnson showed how “presumptions about just calculations of time often fail to account for the
inner time of incarceration, in many cases producing an overabundance of pain.”115
Law’s Role in Constructing Time
Demonstrating that time is not simply a received, natural phenomenon but is shaped and molded
by human hands, other contributions to this line of research outside the tax context have
examined the “law of time”—that is, how law regulates the organization and use of time. In A
Time for Every Purpose, Todd Rakoff explored how law has been used for such varied purposes
as to standardize how to tell time (e.g., by “zone” and through daylight saving time); to carve out
community and family time (e.g., through adoption of so-called blue laws that legally mandate
rest on Sundays); and to limit hours of work (e.g., through enactment of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the embrace of the forty-hour work week).116 As Rakoff explained:
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Social time … is not made up of undifferentiated minutes. Chunks of time are
organized so that the efforts of many people can be coordinated with each other;
so that groups can establish the rhythms that help maintain both their activities
and the groups themselves; and so that different meanings can be assigned to
periods of time for various culturally significant purposes. The specifics of any
particular pattern are, of course, open to debate, but that there ought to be some
such organization is beyond doubt. In particular, in a society such as ours in
which we expect individuals to play many different social roles in a variety of
social settings, it is desirable that there be many different organizations of time to
support these various activities.117
Disjunctures between the various domains of organized time (e.g., between work time
and family time or between a parent’s work time and a child’s school time) can lead to conflicts
and problems that implicate “not only specific rules of law, but a whole additional set of
mechanisms by which the law shapes our social uses of time.”118 According to Rakoff, it is
important to recognize that “[a] central function of the law, especially in a society as wedded to
the law as ours, is to help organize the society. As generations before us have tried to do, we, too,

(raising questions regarding Rakoff’s failure to recognize the role of power relations and
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should use our power of creating law to help us shape a structure of time that will, in turn, help
us to live fulfilled lives.”119
Earlier, in American Indians, Time, and the Law, Charles Wilkinson examined law’s
ability to construct time from an entirely different perspective when he showed how law has
been used to construct barriers against the passage of time, effectively holding time at bay to
create space for the governments of Indian tribes to develop and change over time. Wilkinson
described Indian law as a “time-warped field” in which “many of the basic rights of Indian tribes
depend upon constructions of treaties, statutes, and executive orders promulgated during the
nineteenth century or even eighteenth century.”120 According to Wilkinson: “[E]xcept for the
Reconstruction era civil rights statutes, Indian law has been the vehicle for the modern analysis
of laws enacted during the nation’s first century of existence more frequently than any other
body of law.”121 These “old laws” aimed “to create a measured separatism”—Indian tribes were
to be “largely free from interference by non-Indians or future state governments” but were to be
subject to supervision by, and were to receive support from, the federal government.122 Yet, as
Wilkinson explained, it was not merely a matter of freezing time through “efforts to enforce
solemn promises of another age.”123 “The tribes … have sought and obtained a substantial

119

Id at 184.

120

CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A

MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 13 (1987).
121

Id. at 14.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 41.

38

measure of insulation from many of the negative effects of the passage of time. Concurrently,
however, they have attempted to make time work in their favor by seeking to establish a
vigorous, modern tribal sovereignty with actual powers far beyond those exercised at the time of
the treaties and treaty substitutes.”124 Wilkinson saw the Supreme Court’s “recognition of rules
providing for insulation against time, a tribal right to change, and special Indian law canons of
construction” as both “appropriate” and “necessary” to fostering the “principled growth of those
organic governmental documents [i.e., the treaties and treaty substitutes entered into between the
federal government and the tribes] in much the same way as the Constitution evolves.”125 Law
had thus constructed a seemingly paradoxical bulwark against the passage of time that actually
allowed time to pass and change to occur.

Tax Law and Time
This book extends this line of research on the complex relationships between law and time into
the tax arena. Without purporting to be exhaustive in examining the relationship between tax and
time, my aim in the coming chapters is to show how, after we move beyond obvious connections
and shed the strictures of conventional notions of the relationship between tax and time, it
becomes clear that, as James Boyd White has put it:
[T]he activities which make up the professional life of the lawyer and judge [and,
in the tax context, of the legislator and others participating in the making and
interpretation of tax law] constitute an enterprise of the imagination, an enterprise
whose central performance is the claim of meaning against the odds: the
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translation of the imagination into reality by the power of language. Its art is
accordingly a literary one, most obviously perhaps in the demand that one master
the forces and limits of what we have called the legal language system—speaking,
as it does, in a set of official voices, reducing people to institutional identities,
insisting on repetition of inherited patterns of thought and speech (most
frustratingly in its use of the rule) and reposing an impossible confidence in its
fictional pretenses. The art of the lawyer is perhaps first of all the literary art that
controls this language. To say as much, and to ask how that language can be
controlled—what the lawyer can do with it—is to say that the lawyer is at heart a
writer, one who lives by the power of his imagination.126
This power of the legal—and, more particularly, tax—imagination will be on display
throughout the pages of this book. We will begin our journey through tax time in chapters 1 and
2, which together consider the venerable US tax law doctrine of “substance over form” and its
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statutory incarnations from the perspective of time. In chapter 1, freed from the confines of linear
time, we will witness how this doctrine is used to travel back in time to rewrite the course of past
events and then to act upon that reimagined course of events as if it had actually occurred when
determining past, present, and future tax consequences related to, or based on, those events.
Illustrating that no single tax actor possesses a monopoly on the power to use the tax imagination
to travel through time, we will examine judicial applications of the doctrine at the urging of the
IRS as well as Congress’s own attempts to legislate time travel through the enactment of
statutory antiabuse rules. Although our primary focus will be on US federal tax law, chapter 1
also provides comparative context to show that the United States is not alone in its embrace of
substance-over-form principles and the necessary rejection of a strict adherence to linear
representations of time that those principles entail.
Because this power to turn back time is deployed ostensibly to achieve greater justice and
fairness in the application of the tax laws, it is important to question whether that is the end to
which the power of the tax imagination is actually put to use. It is to this task that chapter 2 turns.
The power to travel back in time and rewrite history—fettered only by one’s own imagining of
what “really” happened or what a “fair” application of the tax laws dictates—opens the door to
arbitrary, unfair, or plainly discriminatory applications of substance-over-form principles. This
possibility becomes concerning particularly when one moves beyond conventional applications
of tax policy principles, such as those explored in chapter 1, that focus on economic
considerations and measure tax equity solely by reference to taxpayers’ income.127 When one
takes a broader view and recognizes the reality that taxpayers are more than merely the sum of
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their financial transactions, it becomes clear that tax law, much like other areas of law, can have
differential—and notably adverse—impacts based on race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class,
gender and gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, disability, and immigration status.128
To illustrate this phenomenon at the intersection of tax and time, chapter 2 focuses on the
element of choice in the doctrine of substance over form; that is to say, when tax actors choose to
use the tax imagination to turn back time—and when not. As examples of situations in which a
choice was made not to apply substance-over-form principles to correct manifest tax (and
intertwined nontax) injustices perpetrated against disadvantaged groups, chapter 2 considers the
IRS’s refusal to recognize domestic partnerships and civil unions after the Supreme Court’s
marriage-equality decisions as well as its slow recognition of the incompatibility of racial
discrimination with classification of an organization as a tax-exempt charity. Despite having
rejected application of substance-over-form principles in both of these cases, the IRS nonetheless
managed to engage the tax imagination in other creative ways that manipulated time for the
benefit of those possessed of power and privilege based on their race and sexual orientation (not
to mention other characteristics).
Moving from the fantastic to the mundane, chapters 3 and 4 give new meaning to the old
adage “time is money.” These chapters consider the ways in which the power of the tax
imagination is deployed to convert time into a form of currency—not using time to commodify
labor in the usual sense of “time is money” but instead reifying time itself and turning it into a
tradeable commodity. Each of these two chapters draws together and combines the two lines of
tax policy analysis that were explored separately in chapters 1 and 2. In other words, they marry
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the more conventional economic focus of “traditional” tax policy analysis with a more “critical”
approach that considers the impact of commodifying time on members of disadvantaged groups
(e.g., based on their race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation).
Chapter 3 focuses on another key concept in tax law: capital cost recovery—the notion
that investments in income-producing assets ought to be recovered over time, whether through
depreciation, amortization, depletion, or some other mechanism. The general purpose of capital
cost recovery is to obtain a better measure of a taxpayer’s income that ought to be subject to tax.
But capital cost recovery can be manipulated easily in ways that turn time into money that the
government can hand out to favored taxpayers. Demonstrating that this is not uniquely a US
pastime, chapter 3 explores examples both from the United States—where there has been a shift
away from recovering cost over time and toward the immediate expensing of investments—and
from Spain—where early twenty-first century changes to the rules for amortizing goodwill on
foreign stock acquisitions aimed to give Spanish companies a leg up in acquiring foreign
enterprises. Naturally, when the government hands out money only to certain persons, especially
when the payment is less than transparent, questions arise regarding who is receiving the money
and whether the payments are being made to advance tax justice or to reward privilege.
In chapter 4, attention shifts to the ways in which taxpayers can use time to barter with
the government in exchange for desired tax results. There are a number of instances in the
Internal Revenue Code where time is treated as a commodity—that is, where a taxpayer will be
afforded tax results that Congress might otherwise deny or be suspicious of due to the potential
for abuse, so long as sufficient time has passed. In other words, if the taxpayer is willing to—and
can afford to—give up a specified amount of time, then the taxpayer can have its desired tax
benefits. Again, where transactions are taking place in less than transparent contexts, questions
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naturally arise regarding who is afforded the special opportunity to shape their tax results in
ways that they deem beneficial and whether this opportunity is being afforded for reasons that
advance tax justice or reward privilege.
Chapter 5 approaches the power of the tax imagination from a different angle: from the
perspective of those who fear its application to them. By way of example, chapter 5 considers the
role of withholding as a mechanism for income tax collection. Withholding is essentially a
matter of timing; it does not impact final tax liability but simply determines whether taxes are to
be paid now (e.g., through withholding when wages are received) or later (e.g., when a tax return
is filed after the end of the year). Reactions to two recent experiences with withholding are used
as illustrations. First, the chapter describes the reaction in the United States to revisions made to
withholding tables to implement the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the signature legislative
achievement of the Trump administration that included tax cuts favoring corporations and
wealthy individual taxpayers). There were early charges that these changes were politically
motivated to gain an advantage in the 2018 midterm congressional elections. Later, during the
spring 2019 tax filing season, the changes triggered a public backlash when widespread attention
was drawn to the drop in the overall number and size of tax refunds. The chapter next
underscores once again that issues of tax time are not unique to the United States by exploring
the constellation of worries voiced by French politicians, taxpayers, and even the government
itself arising out of the replacement of the country’s long-standing delayed-payment regime for
collecting income tax with a new withholding regime. The existence of these fears shows not
only that the tax imagination can shape time to serve specific ends but also how readily we can
recognize the existence of this power when it appears on the surface of the tax system. It should
require only small steps—with this book hopefully being the first such step—for us to open our

44

collective eyes so that we might see and question other, less visible manipulations of tax time as
well.
In the conclusion, the book closes by drawing together these examples of the tax
imagination at work along with the broader discussions of whether we have been using our
power to reimagine time in tax law to work toward greater tax and social justice (or not). Taking
Carol Greenhouse’s admonition that “time is cultural” in a different direction than she might
have intended,129 the conclusion likewise examines the cultural aspects of tax time.130 It analyzes
and considers what the choices that have been made in deploying the tax imagination say about
society—about what and whom society values and, conversely, about what and whom society
leaves out or does not value as highly. In light of these choices and the messages that they send,
it is contended that a systematic examination and reimagination of how we engage with and
deploy time in and through tax law is long overdue—and especially relevant at a moment of
widespread soul-searching regarding the existence and dismantlement of structural inequalities,
occasioned by a combination of the global COVID-19 pandemic and public anger at acts of
violence by law enforcement against minorities in the United States and elsewhere.
***
Through this book I hope to bring a fresh perspective to readers inside and outside tax academia
who are interested in the relationship between law and time, as well as to those interested more
generally in the operation and fairness of the tax laws—a group that should include all members
of society. For readers interested in the relationship between law and time, this book places
needed focus more squarely on statutes through its sustained examination of the intersection of
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time with complex tax legislation. This examination opens new frontiers in thinking about the
relationship between law and time by demonstrating how, even within a single legal domain,
time can simultaneously move in multiple directions and be converted into an inert (yet valuable)
commodity. Throughout, this examination highlights the creative aspects of the use of time in tax
law, exploring how Congress, the federal courts, the IRS, and even taxpayers and their tax
advisers bend and shape time to achieve desired tax goals.
Of interest to a broader audience, this book continues my past work debunking the myth
that tax is an arcane subject knowable only by an initiated few. My aim is to explain tax in a way
that is accessible to nonexperts because everyone deserves to be educated about how the tax
system operates. As the lifeblood of government and the foundation of society, a country’s tax
system embodies and conveys its values, expressing the nation’s sense of self as a society. This
book highlights these cultural aspects of taxation by shining a spotlight on the power and
influence of time on tax law—and, conversely, of tax law on time—while bringing to the fore a
simple notion: the way in which a country chooses to use time in its tax laws sends messages
about its society and is thus deserving of attention from and questioning by all members of that
society.
As we will explore in the coming pages, there is no need to fear the power to manipulate
time in and through tax law. Instead, with greater awareness of the depth and breadth of that
power, we should together take steps to harness that creativity to imagine—and then work
toward—a more just society for all, rather than paying lip service to the idea of furthering justice
while entrenching and exacerbating socioeconomic inequalities in and through tax law.
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